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The 1st Wave
On the road: of bullwhip-effects in supply chains and how to avoid
them
Henk Akkermans
TU Eindhoven and Minase BV
The Netherlands
Life "on the road" may have been wild and exciting in
some places during some times1, but here in The Netherlands, where I
live, roads are mostly neatly maintained, dull and very crowded. Some may get
their kicks out of the stop-and-go traffic movements that are typical of our
overcrowded roads, but not me. If you want your trip home to be exciting in our
small country, try to keep a more or less even speed in the left lane while the
traffic ahead of you first slows down and then ramps up again. Your altruistic
attempt to present those behind you with a stable flow of traffic will not be
appreciated. You will be the cause of many angry faces, claxon sounds and
dangerous overtake maneuvers via the right lane.
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Henk Akkermans is one of the founders of Minase,
a consulting firm based in the Netherlands that focuses on helping companies in
improving design and coordination of the supply networks they form a part of.
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System dynamics modeling and simulation play an
essential role in this, both to engage stakeholders from different backgrounds
in a constructive strategic dialogue and to provide the analytical rigor needed
to tackle complex problems effectively. Henk has been developing system
dynamics models with major companies from the aerospace, electronics, ICT and
life sciences industries such as AKZO, Ameritech, Atos Origin, Boeing, Compaq,
DSM, KPN telecom, Philips Electronics and Stork Aerospace for the past eleven
years. He is also an assistant professor at Eindhoven University of Technology,
from which he holds a Ph.D., and where he teaches supply chain management and
system dynamics and conducts research, often based upon his client work.
E-mail: henk@minase.nl or
h.a.akkermans@tm.tue.nl
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What the systems thinker in you might want to do, if
only to kill the time, is to ponder why this ceaseless slowing down and ramping
occurs. Surely, it has something to do with the number of cars on the road,
because outside of the rush hours this rarely happens. Consider, if you will,
the following thought experiment: a truck moves from the right lane to the
left, never mind that this is normally a useless action. Let's assume that
(this is Europe) the average speed in the left lane was 100 kilometers per hour
and now drops to 90 km, a 10% decrease. What will happen? The first car behind
this truck sees the big fellow moving in front of him and, within a second or
so, pushes the brakes to slow down. Not just to 90, but a bit more, let's say
80, because the small delay in reacting brought him rather close to the vehicle
in front. The car just behind that follows the same pattern: reacting by
slowing down after just a short delay, let's say to 70. In this way, if enough
cars are packed in the left lane, that were first doing a nice 100 km/hr, speed
may drop to 10 or 20 km/hr. Then, speed will pick up again, perhaps back again
to 100. So, a maximum change in the "input" of this particular dynamic system
of cars of -10% results in a maximum change in the behavior of the system in
its "output" of -80% or -90%. Technically speaking, we call this an
amplification ratio of 8 or 9.
This phenomenon of "upstream amplification" occurs in many chains. It happens
in food chains, in the housing industry and is notorious in supply chains,
where it has been labeled the bullwhip effect. Every change downstream
in the chain results in a relatively greater change one step upstream in the
chain. The amplification ratio is greater than 1.0. So, if mobile phone sales
increase 10%, orders to the semiconductor industry for mobile phone chips go up
30%, and orders for new wafer steppers and other equipment used to produce IC
easily double from one year to the next. This phenomenon was already observed
and masterfully analyzed by Prof. Jay Forrester in the late 1950s and described
in his Industrial Dynamics
, still a must-read for all of us systems thinkers.
Delays between perceiving that a change has occurred and reacting to this
change form one part of the explanation for the bullwhip effect. But, there are
more. Several of the explanations focus on locally optimizing behavior of
actors in the chain that result in sub-optimal performance of the chain as a
whole. One important type of behavior is shortage gaming
. When, in 1999, mobile phone producers noticed that the semiconductor
manufacturers of this world could not keep up with their demand, they inflated
their orders for ICs. If I know that you can make 100 and my competitor and I
both need 60, then we normally will both get 50 if the supplier allocates his
stock fairly. But, what if I cheat and ask for 90? Then the supplier will see a
total demand of 150, and if he then tries to allocate fairly, he is over
extended by half of his capacity. So, he will only ship 2 units for every
demand of 3, and so I will receive the 60 I need, while my competitor will only
get 40. Great idea, if only my competitor hadn't thought of the same idea. So,
total demand is inflated and everybody is worse off.
Behavioral routines such as these are the "usual suspects" of the bullwhip
effect and you will find them occasionally in retrospective accounts of a boom
and bust. Unfortunately, these routines are typically forgotten as soon as the
next boom takes off. Much less obvious causes of demand amplification in chains
are our inventory control systems. Wasn't inventory intended to buffer against
fluctuations in the environment and hence smooth what happens behind it? Yes,
but then you need the right algorithms to do so. A widely used inventory
control policy is the order-up-to rule: try and keep the stock level at X,
where X is so many weeks of average demand. So, every period, you try to
produce to stock as much as you need to bring stock levels back to X, taking
into account the expected demand in the coming period. Sounds reasonable
enough, doesn't it? Yes, but let's now assume that it takes you 3 weeks to
produce to stock. Now, demand in one week goes up with 10%. What many
order-up-to policies will assume, is that demand will remain at this higher
level, or at least for the coming three weeks. This means that you will start
producing not 10%, but 3 times 10%. Hence, you will order 30% more materials,
and amplification happens again. This is one example of the unintended
destabilizing effects of inadequate inventory control policies. MRP systems
typically work this way, and MRP lies at the basis of ERP. And ERP, didn't we
just spend several billions in various industries on making that the corner
stone of our goods flow control systems? Yes, we did. And since so many
lemmings can't be wrong, few people are questioning if the algorithms in these
systems are really what we need to make our supply chains perform better.2
ERP may be great to get rid of patchworks of legacy systems, but the MRP
algorithms embedded in it as production control system suck. With the advent of
Advanced Planning Systems (APS) on top of these ERP systems, life does not get
better, on the contrary, because the underlying model remains flawed.
So, what can be done to reduce demand amplification? One can obviously shorten
response delays both in cycle times and in order fulfillment. But, even better,
why don't we move from push to pull? MRP pushes goods through chains, but if
you only pull through the chain what you need, you will not be making more than
you need, provided your production cycle times are short enough.
Before we diversify into the many pitfalls of cycle time reduction and pull
systems, let's return to our traffic congestion example one more time. This was
not an example of just amplification, but of oscillation
as well. Oscillation, a repeated fluctuation around some long-term average, is
very much present in the visual metaphor of the bullwhip, and also very much a
part of the everyday driving experience of the Dutch commuter. Road speeds keep
going up and down, not just once, but all the time. This need not be because
there is an infinite number of truck drivers that keep moving to the right lane
one after another. In many dynamic systems, it takes only a one-time
disturbance to create a continuous, or at least long-lasting, oscillatory
movement, like a pendulum that keeps swinging for a long time after you have
pushed it once.
The important thing to note here is that this happens because many supply
chains are inherently unstable
. Mathematically speaking, they belong to a class of systems that, for specific
parameter settings, have no stable equilibrium value. Key parameter values here
are the lengths of the various delays in the system. There are no simple
answers as to what the "right" lengths will be, or how they should relate to
each other. What you can do is create a System Dynamics model of the structure
of the system and then conduct a sensitivity analysis: for what parameter
values will this system start to oscillate after a one-time disturbance and
when will it remain stable? Just try and you will be amazed how tiny
differences in values turn an inherently unstable system into a robust one, and
how other sets of parameter values will make fluctuations go totally out of
control.
Of course, such experiments are neither feasible nor wise to do in your car.
However, it is feasible to do this for your business. This may not have been
the kind of excitement that Jack Kerouac was once looking for, but it may just
make your supply chain a much more robust one. And, to me, making that happen
is all the excitement I need.
1
Or so it would seem, when reading Jack Kerouac's beatnik classic from 1955, "On
the Road."
2
There are some notable exceptions, one particularly outspoken one is from
Wallace Hopp and Mark Spearman, who in their excellent book, "Factory Physics,"
repeatedly point out how MRP is based on a flawed model.
This article is the second in a series of eight
articles by Akkermans about Supply Network Dynamics. The 2nd Wave will be
described in the March/April edition of the Connector. To read the introduction
to this series, click here.
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